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CONTRACTUAL CONTROL OVER ADJECTIVE LAW:
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
NATHAN ISAACS t

Fifteen years ago it was possible to call attention to the curious but
persistent attempt that was manifesting itself in business to substitute
"synthetic" arrangements by contract for the traditional machinery for the
enforcement of the law. 1 Attempts were being made to substitute contractual
arrangements for the laws governing venue, periods of limitations, the conflict of laws, summons, mode of trial, evidence, competency of witnesses,
judicial review, self-help, choice of a remedy, and measure of damages.
Occasionally the attempts went so far as to specify that no damages could
be collected or that no action could be brought, at least not until some condition was fulfilled-and this condition might conceivably have been such as
to make a trial highly improbable, if not unnecessary. Such instances are
shown by cases where submission to arbitration or reference, or even the
"satisfaction" of one party, were made conditions precedent to bringing an
action.
Until that time all these or similar attempts were dealt with very casually
in the law books, since they were looked upon as agreements the validity of
which could be questioned on the ground that they interfered with the administration of justice. 2 The courts were very jealous of their jurisdiction and
were still fond of the phrase "ousting the court". In their fear of what
might happen if they yielded an inch, they indulged in magnificent reductiones
ad absurdum.

"If a rule of evidence can be abrogated like this, how long will it be
before the procedure in all the courts of the land will be controlled by
contracts regulating the method of procedure and the competency of
testimony and of witnesses and the sufficiency of proof? Why, this
by-law, if valid, effectively repeals any statute contrary to its provisions.
This company has made a little legislature of itself and would now
perform the judicial functions of this court in controlling through this
by-law how we shall determine the existence of a disputed fact. This
course must be stopped at the threshold or courts of justice will become
lifeless and inanimate machines, mechanically operated by contracts
f A. B., 19o7, A. M., i9o8, Ph. D., LL. B., 19io, University of Cincinnati; S. J.D., 192o,
Harvard University; Professor of Business Law, Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration; author of THE LA.v iN BusrNEss PROBLFmS (1934), and numerous articles in
legal periodicals.
i. Cf. Isaacs, Contractual Control over Adjective Law (1922) 29 W. VA. L. Q. i. The
forms on the basis of which the observations in this article were made had been collected
somewhat earlier.
2. Cf. 3 WMUISTON, CONTRACTS (1920) c. XLVI; 13 C. J.426, § 382. Contrast the very
specific treatment of the latest case book on contracts, CosTIGAx, CASES ON CONTRACTS (3d
ed. 1934) 1027 et seq., upon material from which I have drawn freely in this paper.
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often unfairly depriving an unsuspecting party of statutory rights which
he did not intend to surrender." 3
The court in that particular case, decided only ten years ago, described such
attempts to abrogate rules of evidence by contract as "a very modern innovation". But the idea behind the innovation is very old. Roman legal procedure is based on the theory that the parties have agreed to submit to a
particular outcome, even though the gist of the action may be in tort. Hence
comes the concept, which we have somewhat mechanically copied in AngloAmerican law, that a judgment is a quasi-contract. Under Anglo-American
law, it is true, we incline towards a tort theory in procedure, even where the
cause of action is the breach of the contract. Nevertheless, "joining in
issue", so vital and so troublesome a factor in the history of our pleading,
is at bottom a concession that submission to trial, even by the established
forms and in the regular tribunals, is essentially a contractual undertaking.
Without such an approach, it is difficult to see how trial by jury could have
found its way to the courts in place of the older modes of trial even when
they were rendered impractical by the refusal of the Church to participate in
them. In other words, there was a time when the most firmly established of
our traditional modes of trial was in itself a "synthetic" arrangement for
contractual control over adjective law.
But we need not go back so far in the history of law to find experiments
whereby the parties withdrew from the ordinary modes of trial either all or
a part of a pending dispute. In spite of the long discouragement of arbitration by the common law courts, a condition which persisted here longer than
in England, arbitration has been continuously used. The hearing of cases
upon agreed statements of facts may represent an equally artificial substitute
for the determination of questions of fact by trial. Stipulations of counsel
with the approval of the court-have long been allowed a wide influence on
the course of pending litigation. But by no means have all such attempts in
the past been limited to pending cases. Insurance companies in the period of
their greatest latitude in drawing their own contracts, that is, prior to the
standardizing of the twentieth century, have led the way with their own provisions as to how and when they must be notified of claims, how and when
they must be sued, how particular facts must be proved, what shall be presumptive and what conclusive and what indispensable evidence, what law or
laws shall govern, and so forth. Questions are still arising, as in the case
quoted above, when the contractual clause as to what constitutes a proof of
death clashes with a common law presumption or a statutory conclusion;
but in the main the tempering of the one-sidedness of insurance contracts by
3. Modern Woodmen of America v. Michelin, IOI Okla. 217,
(1924).
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adjudication, legislation, and administrative control lies behind the post-war
period now under review.
In the last fifteen years a great deal has happened to change the problem
its
solution. In the first place, arbitration statutes have been passed very
and
widely, under which acts it is lawful not only to submit future as well as
pending disputes to arbitration, but also to make irrevocable submissions and
to obtain awards that have the standing of judgments. It is no longer the
fashion to talk of the danger of ousting courts from their jurisdiction. 4 In
the second place, there has been a good deal of discussion of contracts as to
evidence, concerning which there has come forth an increasing realization
that rules of evidence are but convenient arrangements related in the main
to the history of trial by jury and by no means beyond the possibility of
improvement for given sets of conditions. 5 In any event, a distinction has
been discovered between those few rules in which the public has an interest
for its own protection, notably in the enforcement of criminal law, and the
general run of rules which can easily be waived, if the parties are willing,
without raising any question of public policy. In the third place, big business
and even moderately sized business has of late been following the example
of the old insurance companies in preparing forms to be signed on the dotted
line. In sales forms, order forms, employment forms, leases, service contracts, or whatever they draft, one encounters a new crop of exculpatory
clauses; understandings that an officer or employee of one party shall be judge
and jury if any controversy arises; extensive powers reserved, the actual
exercise of which would shock the business world; self-help bargained for;
deposits demanded; liens created or negatived; and powers to confess judgment extended to new fields. The extent to which this experimentation had
gone was realized early in the depression, when men who had signed brokers'
cards or bankers' forms were astonished to see how quickly they could be
sold out and with how little redress, even where they felt they had been
unfairly treated, not only through the absence of warning but in many cases
through the presence of reassurance. A fourth consideration, likely to
become more important in the years immediately ahead of us, is the rather
liberal guiding lines laid down on the subject in the Restatement of the Law
of Contracts.6 Finally, we have become acquainted with numerous nonjudicial modes of handling disputes of fact, particularly of the nature of
4. How the statutes have removed the curse even from common law arbitration is well
illustrated in Ezell v. Rocky Mountain Bean & Elevator Co., 76 Colo. 4o9, 232 Pac. 68o

(1925).

5. See Wigmore, Contracts to Alter or Waive the Rides of Evidence (1921) 16 IL. L.
REV. 87; Chafee, The Progressof the Law, 1919-I921: Evidence (1922) 35 HARv. L. REV.
3o2, 306; Note (1932) 46 HARv. L. REv. 138; Note (1933) 82 U. OF PA. L. REV. 561.
6. The subject is covered in RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) under the general heading
Bargains Tending to Obstruct the Administration of Justice, beginning with § 54o, entirely in
the manner of the early text books above referred to. The changes of tone and content, however, will be noted as we proceed.
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hearings before administrative tribunals. Some of our workmen's compensation laws contemplate a contractual substitution of such tribunals for ordinary courts. The result may be expected, on the whole, to show itself in
greater liberality on the part of courts in allowing parties to the contract to
choose their own mode of settling their disputes, coupled with a keener search
for guiding principles to isolate those special cases that are contrary to public
policy. And such has, in the main, been the actual development.
Let us consider, first, the substitutes for the whole of legal procedure and
then the substitutes for each part of the history of a case taken chronologically. In each situation we must pay particular attention to the principles
currently laid down for distinguishing between the permissible and the forbidden deviations from standard practice.
Among the substitutes for court procedure as a whole there are, first,
provisions in the nature of substituted modes of proceeding, and secondly,
provisions that look to no trial or hearing or similar procedure at all. Arbitration as the term is generally understood may fall within either of these
categories. 7" Reference in its strictest sense is a substitute for trial, not a
mode of trial, though the sharp distinctions may be toned down by special
arrangements permitting the referee to supplement his information by conducting hearings. The legal principle on the basis of which such arrangements are upheld is the fine-spun one of saying that they do not exclude
proper court action but merely constitute conditions precedent to the perfection of a right of action. It is interesting to see a half-hearted acceptance of
this doctrine in the Restatement." It is not illegal (in the absence of legislation) to make arbitration or reference as to one or more facts a condition
precedent to bringing an action, but it is illegal to make arbitration of the
whole question of whether there has been a breach of contract a condition
to any right of action. The fear of "ousting" has left its imprint on the
common law.
If we view arbitration as a mode of trial we find another type of precaution or prejudice against it that expresses itself in such phrases as "unless
the agreed terms of arbitration are unfair," 9 or "unless its terms under the
circumstances are unfair".'0 Such a principle of division between legal and
illegal agreements to arbitrate, while understandable, is exceedingly difficult
to apply. It leaves the question open for a court in every case, whether the
terms are fair or not, and affords little guidance to reach either conclusion.
Presumably, terms that gave a party in interest the position of an arbitrator,"
or terms that gave one side an initial advantage, might be so construed. But
7. Isaacs, Two Views of Commercial Arbitration (1927) 40 H~Av. L. REv.

8.RESTATEMENT, CONTRAcrs (1932) § 551.
9. Id. § 550.
io. Id. § 551.
ii.

(1927).

929.
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what about such terms as the following: the exclusion of lawyers; the
acceptance or non-acceptance of technical rules of evidence; time limits;
secrecy; the rules of a particular trade association, chamber of commerce, or
similar association; provision for default award; and authorization of private investigations by arbitrators in the absence of the parties? An argument
can be put forward against the fairness-at least under given circumstancesof any one of these or a hundred other terms in arbitration agreements. If
the "fairness" test is to stand, many questions must still be answered. Of
course, we are not concerned with such unfairness as avoids the whole
arbitration clause, such as the duress complained of in one stage of the history
of contracts in the moving picture industry. : 2 The unfairness there was not
in the terms of arbitration but in the making of the contract that provided
for arbitration.
Coming to the contractual points with reference to the particular steps
in procedure, we are confronted at the threshold with attempts to substitute
general consents for the old tradition of a personal summons. The progress
made in recent years in this direction is notorious in the case of dealing with
violators of automobile laws.' 3 There is a tendency to lay down as a condition precedent to the issuance of a license a consent to be summoned either
by a notice left with an officer of the state or by some informal mode of
communication. In fact, the tendency has gone further and seems to point
in the direction of looking upon the tagging of a machine as the equivalent
of a personal summons in both civil and criminal proceedings. Curiously
enough, these suggestions are put forward under the guise of contract.
Thus, the use of the highways of the state is extended on the acceptance of
this peculiar condition. 1 4 The idea is of course not new. For a long time
it has been part of the corporation law of many jurisdictions that as a condition precedent either to incorporation or to doing business in particular
states, agents for the acceptance of summons within those states had to be
named. 15 Under continental law, non-resident stockholders in buying stock
submitted to being summoned into court on matters relating to the corporation by notice issued to the office of the corporation.'" As between individual
citizens, such arrangements as waiving summons in cognovit notes and judgment leases for the confession of judgment are of course not new. Nevertheless, the extension of the practice is dangerous, and courts may well be
12. Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U. S. 30 (193o).

13. See Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U. S. 16o (I916) ; Hess v4 Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352
As to service by "tagging", see People v. Levins, 273 N. Y. Supp. 941 (Ct. Spec.
Sess. 1934).
14. In Hess v. Pawloskl, 274 U. S. 352, 357 (1927), the court refused to see much difference between the express and the implied contract: "The difference between the formal and
implied appointment is not substantial, so far as concerns the application of the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
I5. PARIngm, CORPORATION MANUJAL (annual) § 52, under each State.
I6. Cf. Copin v. Adamson, L. R. 9 Ex. 345 (1874).
(1927).
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expected either to set limits to the possibility of doing away entirely with
the necessity of summons by contract, or at least to take precautions in individual cases as they arise. Certainly the criticism of the machinery which
the common law provides for obtaining jurisdiction over a person has its
point in these days of accelerated business life and widespread business operations across state lines. In this problem the dividing legal principle involves
a question of constitutional rights and of the power of the citizen to barter
or sell or give away such rights. The Restatement is exceedingly vague and
general on this point. Unreasonable restriction of the liberty or freedom of
action of a party is illegal. 1 7 But whether it is such unreasonable restriction
to lay one's self open to court action without anything resembling the traditional summons, we are not told. The automobile cases make light of the
matter.
However favorable the courts might be to arrangements extending the
jurisdiction of courts by means of contracts among the parties, they have
almost uniformly frowned on attempts in the opposite direction.' 8 The
Restatement, however, leaves the matter in the air except as to the concurrent
jurisdiction of federal and state courts. Is it "unreasonable", for example,
to contract against the option to resort first to a squire's court or administrative board or other limited tribunal whose decisions are to be swept aside
if the case is appealed to the ordinary courts and tried de novo?
"A bargain to forego a privilege, that otherwise would exist, to
litigate in a Federal Court rather than in a State Court, or in a State
Court rather than in a Federal Court, or otherwise to limit unreasonably
the tribunal to which resort may be had for the enforcement of a possible
future right of action .

.

. is illegal." 19

One of the objects sought to be accomplished by such a delimitation of
choice among jurisdictions has to do with clarifying the question "What law
governs?" Theoretically, it should make no difference in substantive law
whether the action is brought in one jurisdiction or another. The adjective
law, however, is quite likely to carry with it not only something of substantive
right, but under a given set of facts, after a controversy has arisen, it may,
by a rule excluding a bit of evidence, or some similar rule, determine the
probable outcome of the case. The law has gradually come to permit a
deliberate choice of law on the part of parties to a contract, so far as such
choice amounts to a clarification of their intention, or of the nature of judicial
definition of the words used, provided, first, that the point contracted for is
not contrary to the public policy of the jurisdiction whose law would normally
§ 591.
18. Among recent cases involving the point are: General Motors Acc. Corp. of Cal. v.
Robinson, 207 Cal. 285, 277 Pac. 1039 (1929) ; General Motors Acc. Corp. v. Hunsaker, 50
S. W. (2d) 367 (Tex. Civ. App. i932). See Note (1925) 74 U. OF PA. L. Rv. 89.
i9. § 558.
17. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (932)

-
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govern, or of the forum, and provided, further, that the particular law
chosen has some raison d'tre in the case and is not merely read in by the
20
parties arbitrarily or in bad faith.
When we reach the actual trial of a case, we are more clearly within the
province in which the traditions of the court rather than the wishes of the
parties must be given consideration. Certainly an attempt to substitute a
form of trial for which the court is not equipped or for which it has no
traditions must be frowned upon, particularly in view of the opportunity
rendered by arbitration statutes to substitute a different kind of tribunal
where an entirely different kind of trial is sought. Of course, waiver of a
jury is today a matter of a consensual nature, just as authorization of a jury
trial was historically. Stipulations between the parties as to modified juries
are obviously no more difficult to uphold than the waiver of jury trial altogether. In fact, at this point stipulations of counsel furnish a very large
opportunity for contractual control over adjective law. Waivers of formalities, the extension of time for particular steps, the admission of certain types
of evidence either absolutely or conditionally-all such matters in so far as
they tend to facilitate and expedite the administration of justice are favored,
provided they meet with the approval of the court. Such stipulations, however, are to be distinguished sharply from similar ideas introduced into contracts in the absence of pending litigation and without the benefit of a court's
2
scrutiny. 1
The evidence adduced at a trial and its relation to the contractual control
of the parties has in recent years received much more attention at the hands
of authors than have any of the other aspects of contractual control or interference with procedure. Dean Wigmore at the opening of the period under
consideration advocated a relaxation of the rule against giving effect to such
agreements. 2 2 Courts have been reluctant to do so, largely because of a
feeling that the wisdom of the ages was crystallized in the rules of evidence
that had developed in court. 23 They fail to see at times the accidental nature
20. The cases are collected in 12 C. J. 451, § 32, where the leading case of Arnold v. Potter, 22 Iowa 194 (1867), is quoted: "In thus holding, we, of course, do not decide that two

citizens of Massachusetts could make a contract in that State, payable there or in New York,

agree to be governed by the laws of Iowa or California, and thereby avoid the consequences
of the usury. Nor do we hold that a citizen of one State could make his note in another to a
resident there, payable in a third, with interest as allowed in a fourth."
21. The whole subject of stipulations is exhaustively treated in a new article in 6o C. J.
36. The matters which may be the subject of stipulations, listed there, include most of the
topics on which contracts with reference to adjective law touch. By definition, however,
these stipulations are distinguished from contracts, even from contracts made in the course of
judicial proceedings. If they are contractual at all, it must be remembered that they are not
only agreements between parties but between the parties and the court. Unlike contracts,
they need no consideration to support them.
22. Wigmore, supra note 6.
23. See Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Davis, 129 Kan. 790, 8Ol, 294 Pac. 430,
435 (1930), where the court after reviewing at length Mr. Wigmore's argument says: "This
court likes to be considered progressive, but not to the extent that we are going to set aside
the established order of things to encourage new experiments. We choose to look before we
leap."
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of some of these rules, which are manifestly based on convenience under the
jury system. They suspect any new suggestion, particularly one that might
introduce a type of evidence with which they have not become familiar. Of
course this point of view has more justification in some situations than in
others. Where the attempt is made to introduce hearsay evidence, for example, or in very general terms to throw down the bars of technical rules of
evidence, there is occasion for hesitation about the new and untried course
of procedure. On the other hand, where the point has to do with such a
specific matter as the use of a particular document which under the ordinary
rules of evidence would not be admissible because it is not considered the
best evidence, we have an entirely different problem. The situation is met
sometimes by indirection, as where it is recited that each of several copies of
a contract is an original, or where in the absence of such a provision the law
says so. Furthermore, since the law of its own accord can recognize a
method of handling records which treats a third or fourth copy as in effect
an original entry, it is difficult to see why parties may not by an agreement in
advance hasten, for the purposes of a particular case, any recognition of
such a system in that way. The real difficulty comes where the parties attempt
to open the way for evidence or for witnesses excluded by rule of law. One
must consider in such cases whether the sole parties interested in such a rule
are the parties to such a contract. It may be that the witness whose testimony
is excluded is also one of the parties protected, or it may be that society has
an interest in excluding the testimony. Thus, where two parties to litigation
are willing to unseal the lips of a clergyman, physician, lawyer, or spouse, in
a place where any of these are incompetent witnesses, it may well be contended
that there are reasons for refusing to hear such witnesses that transcend the
interest of the parties to the case.
A distinction might well be recognized between those types of contracts
relating to evidence and those in which the parties agree that only by proving
one set of facts shall they be deemed to have satisfied a condition of a contract. Thus, if an insurance agreement speaks of the sickness or disability
of the person insured and then stipulates what shall constitute an adequate
proof of sickness or disability, it may well be argued that what is insured
against is the set of facts crudely described as evidential. Nevertheless, such
24
contracts are also in disfavor.

Where arbitration is substituted for the jury trial, and even where a
jury is waived and the trial of facts is before the court, it is possible to go
some length in permitting the judge to look into matters that might conceivably be looked upon as dangerous if placed before a jury. It is possible, for
example, to permit an arbitrator to make an investigation of his own, outside
the ordinary course of the hearing. It is not only possible to stipulate that
24. American Beneficial Life Ass'n v. Hall, 96-Ind. 498, 185 N. E. 344 (I933).
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he may take his own expert knowledge into consideration in reaching a conclusion, but, by the very nature of the case, when he is chosen because he is
an expert it is difficult to contend that he is bound to disregard his own
special information. Dangerous as it may be to tamper with the whole
institution of jury trial by attempting to permit similar privileges to a jury,
it is at least debatable whether under proper judicial supervision it may not
be desirable to relax the rigors of the jury system somewhat similarly.
Attempts have been made to modify procedure after hearing or trial,
particularly so as to cut off the right to demand judicial review. On the one
side it may be argued that such a stipulation makes of the lower tribunal an
arbitrator, and that if arbitration is permissible without review on the merits
of the case a stipulation limiting the parties to one day in court is a fortiori
permissible. On the other hand, it may be contended that our system of
judicial review does not exist merely for the benefit of the parties in an
individual case but serves a social function without which our whole judicial
system would be a different thing than it is. Courts are accordingly still
divided upon the permissibility of such agreements.
Of course what one does with a judgment after he gets it is, in a
measure, a matter for his own initiative. He may use it as a basis for
collection, or for negotiating, or, in the instance of a test case, for future
reference. It is quite possible and common to compromise after a judgment
has been rendered. May one agree in advance that a judgment if rendered
will not be enforced? The difficulty we run into here is again the jealousy of
courts, which is awakened at the merest suggestion that they are being asked
to decide a moot question. The line of argument which distinguishes such
questions from moot questions, however, is familiar in connection with
recent discussions of the declaratory judgment. Nevertheless, an agreement
not to use a judgment might well be interpreted by a court as the equivalent
of a discharge from liability and thus be allowed to operate as a bar to recovery.20 There is perhaps no great need for this kind of arrangement, especially
in view of the growth of the declaratory judgment idea.
On the question whether one may extend the time for a statute of
limitations otherwise than by using existing legal distinctions such as adding
a seal, there is little or no pressure from business, although the validity of
an agreement not to plead the Statute of Limitations is a current subject for
dispute, with a tendency in the period under discussion to recognize such
agreements. 26 The Restatement seems to limit its treatment of time contracts to the opposite endeavor of further restricting the time within which
action may be brought. "A bargain to . . . limit unreasonably . . .
the time within which a possible future claim may be asserted is illegal."
25. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932)

§ 556.

26. McGee v. Jones, 79 Cal. App. 403, 249 Pac. 544 (1926). Notes (930)
REv. 383; (I926) 39 HARv. L. -Ev. 771; (925) 74 U. OF PA. L. REV. 193.

30 COL. L.
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This, of course, is a topic more likely to arise in accordance with the acceler27
ated conditions of modern business life.
One other type of clause, established perhaps longer than any of those
so far discussed, is a provision for the liquidation of damages. What the
courts have done in this field is familiar to every law student. They have
made a sharp theoretical distinction between penalties, which are not enforceable, and bona fide liquidations of damage, which they respect. The distinction has frequently been criticised, and it has been pointed out that courts
first decide whether they will uphold a particular provision, and then call
it by one name or the other. Nevertheless, the distinction has held. In fact
it has in the course of time justified itself with the aid of a fine series of
decisions that have gradually drawn a fairly clear line between liquidated
damages and penalties. As laid down in the Restatement the theory has two
features: first, that the harm must be one either incapable or very difficult
of accurate estimation; and second, that the amount fixed must be a reasonable forecast of just compensation. The principle at first seems not very
clear-in fact it is frequently obvious that the reasoning of the courts in
rejecting or upholding an arrangement for liquidated damages is not clearly
articulated. But if we compare the articulated principles already gathered
in connection with our discussion of all the lines drawn by courts between
permissible and prohibited contractual modifications of adjective law, we
may get an understanding of what underlies the practical decisions in the
matter of liquidated damages.
To summarize these principles, then, we find, short of the old doctrine
that it was no affair of the parties to control procedure, first, the suggestion
that everything depends on whether the proposition is in the form of a condition precedent to litigation or not. This distinction has crumbled. Second,
that in some particulars it depends on whether it is the whole case or only
particular facts that are withdrawn from the ordinary channels of dispute.
This is a weak compromise with no principle behind it. Third, whether the
provision pertains to present or future litigation. The tendency of arbitration law is to knock down this fence. Its real importance in the matter of
stipulations is perhaps that it gives an opportunity for insisting on judicial
regulation. Here is at least a suggestion of a principle-let us number it
fourth-that contractual control over adjective law should be subjected to
27. See 37 C. J. 728, § 45 n. Considerable light is thrown on what will be held to constitute an unreasonable curtailment of the period. Among the more obvious cases of interfering
with the administration of justice not specifically discussed here are: the paying of extra fees
to ordinary witnesses; the restricting of bidding at judicial sales; the waiver in advance of an
equity of redemption, or of a right to go into bankruptcy or to use particular defenses such
as fraud or usury or to sue alone without the joinder of other parties in interest. In many
instances the cases turn on questions of statutory interpretation. It is, of course, quite possible for a statute so to lay down a point of public policy as to make contracts that are inconsistent with it unenforceable. The question whether any particular statute was intended as a
formulation of such public policy presents, of course, the major difficulty.
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judicial review. Fifth, there are suggestions that the line of demarcation is
between what is fair and what is unfair-a difficult dichotomy that has the
disadvantage of sending us back into the courts, from which we tried to
escape, and sending us there to spend our time on a collateral matter instead
of the main issue. Sixth, a distinction has been drawn between provisions
of adjective law made for the benefit of the public and those made for the
parties. The idea is good, but its application is fraught with too many doubts
to be feasible, especially when presented in the form of a question as to what
dangers frequent indulgence in a particular relaxation of a rule might lead
to. Seventh, something has been made of the danger of using the court for
what seems to be a moot question. The principle prohibiting such action is
clear, but it may be made equally clear, as it has been in the case of declaratory
judgments, that the willingness to forego damages or any other remedy does
not make a dispute as to legal rights nor the desire to have them adjudicated
any the less genuine. Eighth, in some instances, at least, the question has
been disposed of as one of statutory interpretation, the question being
whether the method laid down by a statute is exclusive or merely presumptive
and, further, whether it is intended to embody a principle of public policy or
merely a practical choice of the method where it is more important that some
method be chosen than that a particular one be given preference over all
others. Finally, we have reached an unpromising line of cleavage with which
courts have bungled through very well-that between penalties and liquidated
damages.
The essential difference between a penalty and an unenforceable agreement to liquidate damages is not simply one of size, though roughly speaking
one may say that a sum constitutes a penalty if it is relatively large and
disproportionate to the purpose it is calculated to serve. Nor is the difference
one of intent, though of course if it becomes obvious that the contracting
parties had no thought of reaching a conclusion as to the actual damages
likely to result, we are dealing with a penalty. Nor is the difference to be
found by distinguishing between those cases in which damages are readily
ascertainable by a jury through the ordinary methods and those in which damages are not readily ascertainable, though here, too, we may have a helpful
indication. Certainly the distinction is not between those matters which a
court considers distinctly within the scope of its prerogative and those as to
which public policy is silent; there is no suspicion here of ousting the court
of its jurisdiction. The essential distinction is this: that those agreements
which tend to forward the purposes of the administration of justice are to
be upheld, while those that tend to obstruct it or to substitute some artificial
standard for it are condemned.
If we take this principle developed in connection with liquidated damages
and apply it to the other doubtful cases of attempts by parties to substitute
their own plans for the ordinary procedure of courts, we have, it is submitted,
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a valid distinguishing principle. It is not possible, for example, to say that
all contracts as to evidence, or all contracts as to jurisdiction, or as to any of
the other points discussed, are or are not in furtherance of justice. It is
possible, however, in every individual case to raise these questions and reach
a conclusion. Some such method has, it is submitted, already been resorted
to by courts more or less unconsciously, even when they have hidden their
reasoning behind such words as "unfair", "unreasonable", or the questionbegging "ousting" phrase. With the real question revealed, whether the
contracts in question tend to promote the administration of justice or to
block it, we may hope eventually to draw safe and useful guide-lines for the
drafting of such contractual clauses and thereby not only avoid a hindrance
but create a genuine aid in settling disputes.

